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Abstract:  The idea of an exogenous money supply—controlled entirely through central 
bank interventions—was a fundamental tenet of monetarism and New Classical economics. Post 
Keynesians have developed an extensive literature arguing that the money supply is in fact 
endogenous—that market forces combine with central banks in establishing the money supply.  
But Post Keynesians disagree on a related question:  to what extent are interest rates set 
exogenously by central banks?  To address this issue, this paper presents evidence regarding the 
movement of market interest rates in U.S. financial markets relative to the Federal Reserve-
controlled Federal Funds rate.  Concluding that market interest rates are primarily set through 
market forces—i.e. are largely endogenous—the paper then discusses the primary source of 
interest rate endogeneity.  This is the instability of deregulated financial markets, which leads 
market participants to make wide swings in their risk assessments over time.  It follows that 
effective regulatory policies to stabilize markets and control interest rates directly will increase 
the degree of interest rate exogeneity. The paper concludes with proposals for establishing greater 
control over market interest rates.   
 




I am grateful to Jerry Epstein and Louis-Phillipe Rochon for useful comments on this 
paper.  Over a period of 20 years, I have also benefited from illuminating and spirited discussions 
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1.  Money Supply and Interest Rates:  Endogenous or Exogenous?   
 
The idea of an exogenous money supply was a fundamental tenet of monetarism 
and New Classical economics.  The quantity theory of money, MV = PY, frames the 
approach clearly.  The theory assumes, at least in the short run, that the velocity of money 
(V) and real output (Y) will be constant, either in levels or growth rates.  It then assumes 
that causation runs from the left to the right-hand side of the equation, meaning that 
variations in money growth (M) determine fluctuations in the price level (P)—i.e. the rate 
of inflation or deflation.  Once the M →P relationship is established, it then follows that 
fluctuations in the money supply also determine changes in nominal income, PY.  The 
quantity theory finally assumes that the Central Bank, on its own, has the capacity to 
determine M, through discount-window lending and dynamic open market operations.   
 
  Combining these elements, the conclusion emerges that the Central Bank 
exogenously controls the growth rate of the money supply, and through this capacity, will 
also then determine an economy’s inflation rate and business cycle fluctuations.  That is, 
within the quantity theory approach, broad changes in macroeconomic activity always 
emanate from the Central Bank’s management of the money supply.  Macroeconomic 
fluctuations may appear to emerge from endogenous market forces, such as the animal 
spirits of investors and their perceived credit needs, the capacity of financial institutions 
to innovate, the migration of financial markets from states of relative robustness to 
relative fragility, or the bargaining environment in labor markets.   But quantity theorists 
argued that such appearances are misleading.   
 
  Milton Friedman, in particular, used the quantity theory framework to reach 
powerful, if erroneous, conclusions about absolutely central questions in real world 
economics.  Among other things, Friedman explained the 1930s Depression as having 
resulted from irresponsible Federal Reserve management that led to a massive 
contraction of the U.S. money supply.  Friedman also argued that inflation was “always 
and everywhere” due to central banks allowing the money supply to expand faster than 
the potential growth rate of real output.
1  This was the analytic framework that led to the 
revival and ascendancy of monetarism and allied traditions, including the neoliberal 
approach to economic policy that, beginning in the 1970s and continuing to the present, 
has become dominant throughout the world.
2   
  
  To advance a revived Keynesian theoretical approach, as well as a policy 
framework focused on promoting economic growth with full employment, it was 
necessary to develop a thoroughgoing critique of the notion of exogenous money 
embedded in the quantity theory.  This is the historical context in which the early work 
 
1 Friedman (1968) is a good overview essay of his approach to monetary theory.   
2 Two valuable histories of neoliberalism are Harvey (2005) and Glyn (2006) Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




                                                




  When I began to focus on this issue in the mid 1980s, the efforts of these and 
other authors were  already reasonably far advanced.    They were all making important 
contributions in undermining the main propositions of the quantity theory and 
monetarism.  But it was also clear that while these authors were united in their opposition 
to monetarism, they were not united in advancing a positive theory of money, credit and 
financial markets.  Indeed, as I emphasized in my 1991 paper, their approaches were 
quite distinct.  To my knowledge, Rousseas (1986) was the only one of this early set of 
authors to have explicitly noted and offered some extended observations on this fact.   
 
  By now, of course, there is a large literature that has pursued the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the “structuralist” and “horizontalist” approaches to endogenous 
money theory.
4  I am quite pleased to have played some role in sparking new thinking 
and research work on these questions (Pollin 1991, 1996).  At the same time, in reading 
through this more recent literature, it is not clear that there has been much progress 
toward reconciling the two approaches. 
 
What I had said in that earlier work, and still believe today, is that the central 
tenets of an effective theory of money and finance are as follows:  1) The distinctions 
between money and non-money assets should be seen as matters of degree, and subject to 
change, as financial markets and practices evolve; 2) Innovation is a persistent feature of 
financial market practices, and the effects of this on market outcomes increase as the 
degree of market regulation declines; 3) Normal unregulated financial market practices 
inherently generate states of systemic instability, as financial market participants, 
operating to maximize profits under conditions of uncertainty, systematically assume 
riskier financial positions as cyclical expansions proceed; and 4) The conventionally 
measured velocity of money—expressed, for example as GDP/M1—cannot be assumed 
to be constant, but, rather, as a first approximation, should be assumed to be variable to a 
significant degree.   
 
Moreover, these four concepts are closely interrelated.  Innovation in financial 
markets are primarily driven by efforts to enhance both the liquidity and store of value 
functions of any given financial asset, such as a Certificate of Deposit, a credit derivative, 
or a securitized mortgage.  Basically, this means lowering the costs of converting 
relatively high-yielding illiquid assets into liquid assets.  Such efforts at innovation lead 
to greater risk-taking, and thus, as Minsky (e.g. 1986) argued, an inherent tendency 
toward an increasingly fragile financial structure.  Innovations in the use of financial 
 
3 Some representative references are Kaldor (1958, 1970, 1982), Minsky (1957, 1991), Weintraub (1978), 
Davidson (1972), Weintraub and Davidson (1973), Rousseas (1960, 1986), and Moore (1988). 
4 The collection of papers in Deleplace and Nell (1996) provides the most extensive survey of a second 
generation of thinking on this question, as well as on the relationship between Post Keynesian and 
Circuitists approaches to monetary theory. Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




assets will also lead to market participants economizing on more traditional liquid assets.  
This promotes a rise in conventionally measured velocity (e.g. GDP/M1).    
 
In my view, this is a highly flexible and fruitful framework in which to analyze 
the degree to which a Central Bank can influence the net flows of any given set of liquid 
assets that are bundled together to define “the money supply,” regardless of whether we 
are referring to a narrow measure of the money supply (e.g. M1) or broader measures 
(e.g. M2, M3, etc.)  It is also an effective framework in which to assess the extent to 
which a Central Bank can influence the setting of interest rates—and here I am referring 
to the full range of rates on financial markets, not simply the Federal Funds rate or the 
Discount rate.  Finally, it is most effective framework for considering policy measures to 
promote economic growth, widely-shared access to affordable credit, and financial 
market stability. 
 
The horizontalist approach is focused around a more narrow set of analytic 
questions and policy concerns.  Leaving aside for now discussions about inflation theory, 
Rochon and Vernengo (2001, p. 3) summarize the horizontalist approach as focusing 
around two key assertions:  1) “the rate of interest is exogenous; the monetary authorities 
set it”; and 2) “The money supply—if such an expression is ever appropriate—is fully 
endogenous.  This severs the relationship between the rate of interest and the growth of 
money.”  These are of course strong assertions, and need to be backed up through 
research.   To give proponents of horizonalism their fair due, they have explored these 
positions at considerable length. 
 
  There are elements of these two assertions that are compatible with my own 
conception what constitutes an effective approach to understanding money, credit, and 
financial markets.  There are other elements which are incompatible.  I do not intend to 
work through detailed, point-by-point, explications as to which pieces fit together and 
which pieces don’t.  As it is, Rochon and Vernengo have said that the debate between 
structuralists and horizontalists had reached a point of “sterility” which “took a heavy toll 
on participants (2001, p. 1).”  Wray echoed the same sentiment in commenting that he’d 
“rather watch paint dry than sit through yet another attempt to explicate and synthesize 
horizonalism and structuralism,” (2006, p. 271). 
 
  What I think might be more fruitful is to break down the whole set of issues into 
component parts, with the hope of sharpening the discussion around some of these more 
focused questions.  In this spirit, in this paper, I want to consider two specific interrelated 
questions that flow out of these broader debates as I read them. 
 
  The first question I wish to address is, “to what extent are interest rates 
exogenous?” I emphasize the plural term here—interest rates.  The specific matter I wish 
to explore is this.  Considering the U.S. economy as our empirical case study, let us allow 
for the current discussion that the Federal Funds rate can be set exogeously by the 
Federal Reserve.  In fact, I do not think this is strictly true, even as a first approximation.  
For one thing, the Fed operates with a reaction function that reflects the activities of the Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




                                                
market.   In addition, as the 2007-08 market crisis has emphatically demonstrated yet 
again, the Federal Reserve is required to serve as a lender-of-last-resort during financial 
crises.  In such situations, the Fed’s role is to shovel low-interest short-term credit to a 
distressed market.  The latitude of the Fed to set the Federal Funds rate is thereby 
constrained by the regularity and extent of market distress.
5
 
  Nevertheless, to keep the discussion here focused, we will operate under the 
assumption that the Fed exogenously sets the Federal Funds rate.  But even given this 
assumption, does it also imply that the Fed exogenously controls the full compliment of 
markets rates as well?  In particular, can the Fed exogenously set the long-term rates that 
are most important for influencing investment and household mortgage borrowing?    I 
pose this as a straightforward question own its own terms, without attempting to sift 
through the details of what one or another author—horizontalist, structuralist or 
otherwise—may have previously written on the matter.    
 
  To address this question, I present some simple empirical evidence regarding the 
movement of five market rates relative to the Federal Funds rate—two short term rates, 
the 6-Month Treasury Bond rate, and the bank prime rate; and three long-term rates, the 
10-year Treasury Bond rate, the 30-year mortgage rate, and the Baa corporate bond rate.  
As we will see in considering this evidence, I think it is difficult to sustain an argument 
that the Federal Reserve can exogenously determine most of these market rates, the prime 
rate being the one exception.   
 
Does such evidence contradict the horizontalist perspective?  Again, I don’t think 
there is much to gain from trying to interject such empirical findings as a reference point 
in debating horizontalist perspectives.  This is because, in my view, horizontalists 
seriously waffle on this central matter of concern.  For example, though, as quoted above, 
Rochon and Vernengo (2001) assert strongly in the main text of their introductory paper 
that “the rate of interest is exogenous; the monetary authorities set it,” in the footnote 
accompanying this assertion they write, “If the rate of interest is exogenous, we are 
avoiding discussion of the determination of the spectrum of interest rates,” (2001, p. 7).  
Moore (2001), also relegating this issue to a footnote, offers only methodological 
generalities in his recent discussion on this question.  He writes that “the statement that 
one can never empirically “prove” that a variable is completely exogenous is the same as 
that one can never empirically prove that a series is perfectly random.  One can only 
attempt to refute the existence of particular regularities or patterns, that is, to test if the 
series is nonrandom.  One can never prove that a series is patternless, but merely disprove 
that existence of a particular pattern,” (2001, p. 29).
6
 
Wray’s 2006 paper, “”When Are Interest Rates Exogenous,” explicitly takes up 
the question of primary interest here.  He also concludes that overnight rates are 
 
5 The idea that the Fed’s first responsibility is as lender-of-last resort, and that this responsibility limited its 
ability to set interest rates, was argued forcefully by Minsky (1957). 
6 Moore’s equivocation here is similar to that in Horizonalists and Verticalists, which I pointed out in my 
2001 paper.   Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




                                                
exogenously administered.  But in my view, Wray is also unclear as to what this means 
for the determination of other rates.  To what extent are they also administered?  If other 
rates are not administered, how significant for the conduct of monetary and financial 
market policy is the fact that overnight rates are administered?   Wray does takes pain to 
emphasize that the idea of administered overnight rates does not preclude “a role for 
Keynes’s version of liquidity preference as a theory of asset prices, with liquidity 
preference as one of the components that goes into determining interest rates that are not 
administered by central bank policy.”  Wray also concludes that “none of this is 
inconsistent with Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis according to which expansions 
and evolution in financial practices tend to stretch liquidity and create a fragile financial 
structure more vulnerable to financial crises,” (p. 289).  But the extent, significance, and 
idea itself of exogenously determined interest rates remains ambiguous.   
 
None of these authors, or others in this stream of thought of whom I am aware, 
consider any empirical evidence in advancing their positions.  Perhaps my simple 
empirical exercises here can help sharpen the discussion.     
 
  The second question I wish to consider concerns the policy implications that flow 
from the idea that the Federal Reserve’s control over market rates is limited—that most 
market rates are determined with a high degree of endogeneity as an outcome of financial 
market operations.  Some horizontalists seem to hold the position that allowing for the 
possibility of some significant degree of market interest rate endogeneity leads to a 
passive resignation before the powers of  financial markets.  Lavoie, for example, says 
that I have clung to a “media view” that markets exert influence over the Federal Funds 
rate (2005, p. 705). 
 
This, of course, is not how I would characterize my own position, as expressed in 
previous work.  Rather, my view is that if the Federal Reserve now operates with limited 
power to exogenously set interest rates via their control over the Federal Funds rate, the 
aim should therefore be to incorporate additional policy tools that can increase interest 
rate exogeneity.
 7  The first consideration here needs to be financial market regulations, 
serving as a compliment to Central Bank interest rate policy.  By definition, financial 
deregulation enhances the autonomy of market forces and thereby weakens the Federal 
Reserve’s power to exogenously set interest rates independent of market forces.    Related 
to this is the issue of financial market instability.  If markets are more unstable, then it is 
very likely that the risk premium built into market interest rates will increase.  In short, to 
the extent that one believes central bank policy should operate as an effective exogenous 
force in financial markets, then we should take pains to assemble a set of policies that 
would enable a significant degree of interest rate exogeneity to become a reality.  In this 
section of the paper, I briefly consider three types of policy interventions—securities 
transaction taxes, asset-based reserve requirements, and direct interest rate subsidies.   
 
7 My 1991 and 1996 papers on endogenous money offered brief policy discussions that followed from the 
analytic arguments I advanced.  Some of my earlier work exploring these policy implications in more depth 
include Pollin 1993 and 1995.   Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 





2.  Relative Moments of the Federal Funds and Market Rates   
 
Federal Reserve Policy Interventions, 2000 – 04 
 
  We begin with a simple visual inspection of a crucial recent period in the conduct 
of U.S. monetary policy.  This is the period when Alan Greenspan undertook an 
aggressive effort to fight an impending recession at the end of 2000, relying on large cuts 
in the Federal Funds rate as his primary policy tool. 
 
  As of June 2000, Greenspan pushed the Federal Funds rate up to 6.5 percent, its 
highest level since January 1991.  However, Greenspan had clearly then misread the 
depth of instability in financial markets, the stock market in particular.  As of December 
2000, he began a long series of sharp cuts in the Federal Funds rate.  We can see this in 
Figure 1, which plots the movements of the Federal Funds rate, along with those for 6-
month T-bills, 10-year T-Bonds, 30-year mortgages, and Baa corporate bonds from 
January 2000 to June 2004.   
 
FIGURE 1 BELONGS HERE 
 
  The first Federal Funds cut from the 2000 peak came at the end of December.  
The average monthly figure for the Federal Funds rate fell in January 2001 from 6.4 to 
6.0 percent.  This was the first of a series of eleven cuts in the Federal Funds rate over the 
next year, through which the rate fell to a 40-year low of 1.73 by January 2002.  
Greenspaan maintained the Federal Funds rate between 1.73-1.75 until November, at 
which put he cut the rate again, this time to 1.25 percent.  In July 2003, Greenspan cut the 
Federal Funds rate to 1.00 percent, where it remained for a year.  For the two-year period 
2003-04, the Federal Fund rate was held at its lowest average recorded figure. 
 
  However, despite these highly aggressive moves by Greenspan, we see in Figure 
1 that the impact was not consistent, and certainly not consistently strong, on market 
rates.  The T-bill rate did track the downward movement of the Federal Funds rate step-
by-step.  But the 10-year T-bond rate fell much more modestly.  In June, 2000, the T-
Bond rate was at 6.00, lower than the Federal Funds rate at that point.  By January 2002, 
the T-bond rate had fallen by less than one percentage point, to 5.04 percent.   By June 
2004, it was at 4.73 percent, 3.7 percentage points above the Federal Funds rate, the 
widest spread between these rates since July 1958. 
 
  The Baa and mortgage rates did also fall during the period of the Federal Funds 
rate cuts, but again, much more modestly.  The mortgage rate was at 8.29 in June 2000, 
and was at 6.29 as of June 2004.  The Baa rate was a 8.48 in June 2000 and at 6.78 in 
June 2004.  In both of these cases as well, the spreads between the market rates and the 
Federal Funds rate were at peak or near peak levels. 
 Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




                                                
  Explaining why these virtually unprecedented spreads opened up between the 
Federal Funds rate and the longer-term market rates is beyond the scope of this 
discussion.  Suffice it to say that, in observing this experience, it would be difficult to 
construe an argument that market rates were being set exogenously, as a fixed mark-up 
over the Federal Funds rate.
8
 
  Fluctuations in Interest-Rate Spreads 
 
  We now consider another set of simple observations—the movement of interest 
rate spreads over a longer time period.  In Table 1 and Figure 2, I present data on spreads 
of five rates—T-bills, prime, T-Bonds, mortgages, and Baa bonds—relative to the 
Federal Funds rate over the five most recent full business cycles.  The data begin in 
November 1973, a cyclical peak month, according to the NBER Business Cycle Dating 
Committee.  It proceeds until February 2008, which, as of this writing, is likely to be 
established as the peak, or near the peak, of the full cycle which began with the April 
2001 downturn.  Table 1 presents the figures in terms of means and standards deviations 
over the full five business cycles, while Figure 2 plots the full month-to-month time 
series for each of the interest rate spreads. 
 
  We begin with the summary statistics in Table 1.  Considering first the two 
government paper rates—T-bills and T-bonds—the standard deviation of the spreads are 
larger than the means.  This means that, within these five most recent business cycles at 
least,  we clearly cannot know on a month-to-month basis what these interest-rate spreads 
are likely to be based on knowing the mean mark-up over the full period.  Thus, with 
Treasury bonds, the mean spread is 0.98 percentage points.  But the standard deviation is 
1.84 percentage points.  This is in a market where single digit differences in basis 
points—not full percentage points—affect the behavior of decisions of market 
participants. With the 30-year mortgage and Baa bond rates, the means, at 2.69 and 3.03 
percent respectively, are only about 0.6 percentage points larger than the standard 
deviations.  Thus again, in any given month, it would be reasonable to anticipate that the 
actual spread could be 2 or more percentage points off from the full-period mean values.  
The prime rate spread is the only case in which standard deviation is less than half the 
value of the mean spread of 2.33 percent.   
 
TABLE 1 BELONGS HERE 
 
Based on these descriptive figures, we clearly cannot establish with confidence, 
month-by-month, that we can know what the spread over the Federal Funds rate is likely 
to be.   
 
8 Writing in April 2008, amid a financial crisis and Federal Reserve efforts to counter the crisis and stave 
off recession, the same patterns are recurring.  Thus, Paul Krugman wrote the following in his New York 
Times column of 3/10/08:  “One consequence of the crisis is that while the Fed has been cutting the interest 
rate it controls—the so-called Fed funds rate—the rates that matter most directly to the economy, including 
rates on mortgages and corporate bonds, have been rising.  And that’s sure to worsen the economic 
downturn.” Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 





  This same general conclusion emerges through the visual inspection of the data 
plots for the full five cycles in Figure 2.  One significant point that emerges from these 
plots that isn’t clear from the summary statistics in Table 1 is with respect to the prime 
rate spread.  With the prime rate spread, we do begin to see something close to a fixed 
spread over the Federal Funds rate beginning in the mid-1990s.  Thus, from 1973.11 to 
1994.12, the mean spread of prime over the Federal Funds rate was 1.90 percentage 
points, with a standard deviation of 1.29 percentage points.  From 1995.01 to 2008.02, 
the mean spread was 3.01 percentage points while the standard deviation was down to 
0.20 percentage points.   
 
FIGURE 2 BELONGS HERE 
 
  Here again, it is beyond the focus of this paper to explain the shift commercial 
banks’ operating procedures to have established their prime lending rate as a fixed mark 
up over the Federal Funds rate.  For our purposes, the more important observation from 
these data is the contrast between the pattern with the prime relative to the spreads we see 
with the other market rates.  With the prime since the mid-1990s, we see clearly how a 
fixed mark-up should proceed over time.   The fact that none of the other market rates 
proceed at anything approximating the pattern with prime underscores with these other 
cases the evident and persistent volatility of the spreads over the Federal Funds rate.  
 
  Granger-Causal Relationships between the Federal Funds and Market Rates 
 
  The third set of evidence I wish to introduce is a series of Granger causality tests, 
estimating the sequence of changes between the Federal Funds rate and the various 
market rates we have been examining. 
 
  I conducted a similar series of Granger tests in both my 1991 and 1996 papers.  
The basic question I addressed in both of these previous papers was this: can we observe 
that movements  up or down in the Federal Funds rate consistently occur, as  a sequence, 
prior to movements in the same direction of various market rates?  The notion that market 
interest rates are determined exogenously by movements in the Federal Funds rate would 
certainly seem consistent with such a time sequencing—i.e. that the Federal Reserve acts 
to change the Federal Funds rate, and that this change in the Fed’s monetary policy stance 
leads to subsequent, and broadly equivalent, changes in market rates.   
 
  In this paper, the Granger tests are modeled slightly differently than in my 
previous two papers, reflecting the small technical adjustments in the way the method has 
been specified more recently in the literature.  In this case, the model is specified as 
follows: 
 
 y t = α0 + α1yt-1 + … + αiyt-i +  β1xt-1 + … +  βixt-i + εt    (1) 
 
 x t = α0 + α1xt-1 + … + αixt-i + β1yt-1 + … + βiyt-i + ut      (2) Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 





where the y variable is the series of market rates, inserted one at a time, along with the 
Federal Funds, rate as the x variable.  In equation 1 of this specification, we are 
estimating by how much the changes in the current value of a market rate can be 
explained by its  own past values, then to see whether adding the lagged values of the 
Federal Funds rate can improve the explanation in the movement in the market rate.  The 
market rate is said to be Granger-caused by the Federal Funds rate if the Federal Funds 
rate helps in the prediction of the current values of the market rate—that is, if the 
coefficients on the lagged values of the Federal Fund rate are statistically significant.   In 
equation 2, we test for reverse causality—the extent to which lagged changes in the 
various market rates helps in the prediction of the current value of the Federal Funds rate. 
 
  In my 1991 paper, I reviewed considerations as to why Granger-causality models 
might not offer a legitimate test of the interrelationships between the Federal Funds rate 
and the market rates.  I argued then, and clearly continue to hold, that the Granger tests 
are informative in evaluating the extent to which the Federal Reserve exogenously 
determines market rates.  It may be useful to cite one passage from the previous paper 
here: 
 
Many legitimate objections have been raised about Granger-Sims tests.  
The single most important is that in economics a decision to pursue an 
action often involves preliminary steps and time lags before the action is 
carried out.  If we consider the investment process, for example, financing 
must be secured before the actual investment spending occurs.  Thus, a 
sequentially prior growth in the money supply resulting from the securing 
of financing would appear, by the Granger-Sims criteria, to “cause” the 
investment growth, even though causality actually runs in the opposite 
direction.  However, in the case of relative interest rate changes, once a 
decision to change a rate is made, no significant preliminary steps or time 
lags are involved before the rate will actually change.  Thus, unlike the 
finance/investment relationship, no interest rates much changes before 
others simply because a relationship of sequential priority requires a fixed 
lag structure. 
 
….It is true that some market rates will change in anticipation of Federal 
Reserve action.  But this situation is not equivalent to the 
investment/finance relationship.  For one thing, the fact that the market 
rates rise first is the result of a substantive decision—the decision to 
attempt to anticpate the Fed—by market participants.  There is no 
imperative here for market actors to speculate on Federal Reserve policy 
decisions.  In addition, the Federal Reserve is not obligated to raise its 
rates once the market rates rise in anticipation of Fed increases.  If Fed-
controlled rate changes do nevertheless lag the market to a statistically 
significant extent, this would suggest that there is a substantive basis for 
the market’s sequentially prior action (pp. 372 – 73). Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 





  For the current set of tests, I am examining the Granger-causal relationships for 
the five market rates whose movements I have reported in the previous section—i.e. two 
short-term rates, the prime bank lending rate and the 6-month Treasury Bill rate; and 
three longer-term rates, the 10-year Treasury Bond rate, the 30-year mortgage rate, and 
the Baa corporate bond rate.  I used 12-period lags, i.e. one full year of lagged values of 
both the Federal Funds rate and the various market rates.  The variables are in first-
difference form.  As first differences, all variables are stationary.   
 
  The results of these tests are reported in Table 2.  The figures in the table are F-
statistics. I also show the p-value ranges associated with each of the F-statistics.   
The results in the table are reported for three separate time periods: the full period 
1973.11 – 2008.02; 2; the initial full business cycle, 1973.11 – 1981.06; and the most 
recent full business cycle, 2001.03 – 2008.02.  In addition to considering the results for 
the full five cycles, focusing on the earliest and most recent cycles enables us to consider 
in a straightforward way the extent to which the Granger-causal relationships may 
changed over time. 
 
TABLE 2 BELONGS HERE 
 
  Considering first the results from the full five business cycles, the most consistent 
finding is that there is mutual causality running between the Federal Funds rate and the 
five market rates.  This is true both for the short- and long-term rates. 
 
  The prime bank lending rate is the one case where the degree of causation, as 
measured by the magnitude of the F-statistic, runs overwhelmingly from the Federal 
Funds rate to the prime rate.  This result is consistent with the data plot we saw in Figure 
2, where, from the mid-1990s onward, the prime rate was set as a virtually fixed mark up 
over the Federal Funds rate. 
 
  However, with the other four market rates, the F-statistics are of roughly the same 
magnitude, if not larger, when market rates are tested for Granger-causing the Federal 
Funds rate.  In short, for the other four rates, there is no evidence suggesting a clear one-
way line of causation running from the Federal Funds rate to the market.  This conclusion 
is indeed underscored by the results that we see with the prime rate.  With the prime rate 
alone, the dominant influence running from the Fed to the market emerges clearly from 
the Granger test results.   
 
  For the most part, these relationships for the full five business cycles also hold up 
during the earliest cycle, 1973.11 – 1981.06.  It is only when we move to the most recent 
cycle, 2001.03 – 2008.02, that we find a departure from the patterns of the full five 
cycles.  In considering the long-term market rates during this most recent cycle, there is 
no statistically significant Granger causation running from the Federal Funds rate to the 
market, and virtually none running from the market to the Federal Funds rate.  These 
formal test findings are consistent with the data we have already seen over the period Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




2000.6 – 2004.6, when Greenspan pushed the Federal Funds rate from 6.54 to 1.0, then 
held it at this low level.  As we saw then, the responsiveness of the long-term rates 
Greenspan’s aggressive rate-cutting was weak.     
 
  These findings are somewhat different, though broadly consistent, with those 
reported in my previous two papers.  Those two papers considered data from different 
time periods.  In the 1991 paper, the sample was for 1968.06 – 1988.05.  In the 1996 
paper, I examined 1957.09 to 1990.04, and also divided the full sample into two sub-
periods, 1957.09 – 1969.09 and 1969.10 – 1990.04.  The main difference in the results of 
these earlier exercises relative to the current findings concerned the long-run rates.  With 
those previous results, the evidence showed significant one-way causation running from 
the market to the Fed.  This contrasts with our current results showing significant two-
way causation over the full five cycles, but with this significant mutual influence 
apparently diminishing substantially, to the point of insignificance, in the most recent 
cycle. 
 
  Overall, in considering this most recent set of Granger-causality results along with 
those from my previous two papers, we can point to some robust findings.  The most 
important is that the movements of the Federal Funds rate clearly do not Granger-cause 
movements in long-term market rates.  In some periods, there does seem to be a 
significant level of two-way causation, but this is a less robust finding.  Moreover, with 
the most recent cycle, we see evidence that whatever degree of causation that had existed 
in previous periods has broken down in the most recent cycle, to the point of 
insignificance.   
 
  In my previous two papers, I address at length alternative interpretations of this 
robust pattern of Granger-causality tests.  In particular, I consider the view of some 
critics, as expressed by Moore, that these Granger results are actually supportive of an 
exogenous interest-rate view, since, as Moore put it, “long-term rates are based on market 
participants’ estimates of future short-term rates,” (1988, p. 286).  There is no need here 
to rehash my lengthy responses on this issue.  But just to summarize briefly two key 
points: 
 
  1.  No proponent of exogenous interest-rate theory has shown that long-term rates 
are set solely, or even predominantly, on the basis of market participants’ anticipations of 
short-term rates.  There is no doubt that expectations of Fed policy changes does 
influence the setting of long-term rates.  But the available evidence also supports the 
view that other factors, including, in various combinations, liquidity preference, habitat 
preferences, and expectations about inflation, exchange rates, and market stability, also 
influence the movements of long-term relative to short-term rates.   I return to this point 
below. 
 
  2.  Even if we were to assume that market participants set long-term rates solely 
in anticipation of movements of short-term rates, there is still no reason to assume that 
participants in the long-term market operate with full, unfailing knowledge as to when, Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




and by how much, short-term rates will move.  To make this assumption is to abandon an 
analytic framework grounded in the principles of Keynesian uncertainty, and to enter a 
framework grounded in the principles of perfect foresight. 
 
  Inflation and Default Risk 
 
  We now consider some standard measures of changes in inflation- and default-
risk over time, i.e. as these are reflected in the movements of interest rate spreads. 
 
  Inflation risk.  To measure inflation risk, we observe in Figure 3 the spread 
between the two government debt instruments we have been examining up to now, the 6-
month Treasury Bill rate and the 10-year Treasury Bond rate.  As U.S. government-
issued debt instruments, they both carry no default risk.  Thus, the movement in the 
spread between them will largely reflect the market’s changed perceptions of inflation 
risk—with the long-term rate rising in relative terms to the extent that market participants 
believe accelerating inflation will erode over time the real value of the nominally-fixed 
returns derived from bonds. 
 
FIGURE 3 BELONGS HERE 
 
  The central point that emerges from Figure 3 is that perceptions of inflation risk 
are highly volatile over the full period, with the minimum spread at -2.28 percentage 
points in 1980.03 and the maximum spread at 3.64 percentage points in 1992.05—i.e. a 
difference between the minimum and maximum of nearly six full percentage points.  The 
mean value for this inflation risk spread over the full period is 1.49 percentage points, 
and the standard deviation is nearly as large, at 1.22 percentage points.   
 
  Figure 3 is partitioned by vertical lines drawn at cyclical peak months over the 
full period.  In dividing up the full period this way, it also becomes clear that inflation 
risk fluctuates broadly with the overall business cycle.  During each business cycle 
expansion, the T-Bond rate rises relative to the T-Bill rate, indicating a rise in the 
market’s perception of inflation risk as the cycle proceeds into its expansion and up to its 
mid-point.  Moving past the cycle mid-point, perceptions of inflation risk start to decline 
and are generally low by the time the expansion is reaching its end-point.   
 
While this is a broadly applicable pattern, we also see that the details vary from 
one cycle to the next.   What is more generally evident from Figure 3 is that there is no 
roughly fixed level of inflation risk perceptions in financial markets, either over the 
course of individual business cycles or in moving over the longer term from one cycle to 
the next. 
 
Default risk.  To examine default risk, I plotted two sets of interest rate spreads—
the spreads between the 10-year Treasury Bond rate and, respectively, the Baa corporate 
bond rate and the 30-year mortgage rate.  These are both shown in Figure 4.  With both 
spread measures, we are, of course, comparing the relative movements of a long-term Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




government bond that is free of default risk with two debt instruments that are subject to 
default risk. 
 
FIGURE 4 BELONGS HERE 
 
The first thing that is clear in observing these two data plots is how differently 
they behave.  They proceed in broadly similar patterns through the mid-1980s.  But 
thereafter the Baa spread becomes much more volatile.  The Baa spread also follows 
distinct patterns through the two most recent cycles, rising to a peak of 3.79 percentage 
points in 2002.10, before falling sharply again in that cycle to 1.56 in 2007.02, then rising 
again by the end of the period, in 2008.02 to 3.08 percentage points.   
 
The relatively mild fluctuations in the 30-year mortgage rate spread bear little 
relationship to the much more dramatic events that have occurred in the overall mortgage 
market over this period.  These events include the collapse and bailout of the Savings & 
Loan industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s; and the housing market bubble and crash 
during the most recent full cycle.  The crash of the housing bubble also lead to the 
subprime mortgage market crisis that is ongoing as of this writing.  Indeed, the likelihood 
is high that the current crisis will spread beyond the subprime mortgage market later in 
2008.   These events clearly were not incorporated into the default risk perceptions of 
those participating in at least the 30-year mortgage market. 
 
To draw out some general points from Figures 3 and 4, I should emphasize again 
that our aim here is not to advance a theory of either inflation or default risk, or even to 
attempt a full specification of how to measure these phenomena.  Rather the main points 
one can take from these simple descriptive observations relatively modest and 
straightforward:  1) spreads vary significantly over time, and that perceptions of risk are 
reflected in the ways these spreads fluctuate; 2) the spreads vary both within and between 
business cycles; and 3) spreads vary between financial market segments, such as the Baa 
corporate bond and mortgage markets. 
 
To incorporate these observations within the overall issue at hand in this paper, it 
will be useful to pose this question:  when the Federal Reserve adjusts the Federal Funds 
rate, can we reasonably predict what will happen at the same time with inflation risk and 
default risk?    We have seen that inflation risk and default risk vary significantly over 
time and between market segments.  As such, the link between Federal Reserve 
interventions to move the Federal Funds rate will not lead to predictable results with 
respect to longer-term market rates.   
 
3.  Systemic Instability and Interest Rate Exogeneity 
 
  As I emphasized in my 1991 and 1996 papers, a fully developed theory of money 
supply endogeneity needs to be embedded with a broader theory of systemic financial 
instability.  This broader framework, in turn, will provide the foundation for establishing 
effective policy interventions to promote financial market stability and widely-shared Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




                                                
access to affordable credit.  This is also how the degree of interest rate exogeneity can be 
increased.  Control over the Federal Funds rate, and equivalent short-term rates in other 
economies, are not capable on their own of serving this broader purpose. 
 
  The basic reasons why this is so flow readily from the Keynes/Minsky theory of 
systemic instability.  The approach emphasized by Keynes and Minsky builds from a 
fundamental fact about the nature of capitalist economies: that the investment process—
the basic activity which is a proximate determinate of an economy’s level of income, 
employment and productivity growth—is unstable because it operates on the basis of 
uncertainty.  As Keynes (1936) famously put it, “we simply do not know” how profitable 
a prospective investment project will be.  A primary purpose of financial markets is to 
ameliorate problems due to uncertainty through increasing the liquidity of investments.  
When financial instruments are freely traded in relatively thick markets, illiquid 
investments in plant and equipment can be transformed into claims that are convertible 
into cash or other liquid assets as quickly as the institutional and technological structures 
permit.  However, enhancing the liquidity of assets also tends to create serious problems 
for the stability of capitalist economies.  An initial analysis of these sources of instability 
was presented forcefully in Keynes’s General Theory.  But this critical literature has of 
course developed widely since Keynes, including here Minksy’s seminal contributions, 
along with many others in the Post Keynesian tradition.
9   
 
There have been important insights developed from more mainstream 
perspectives, including those coming from behavioral economics.  One important 
contribution has been that of Schiller (e.g. 2000), who emphasizes the role of investor 
psychology, independent of individual firm fundamentals, as a major determinant of 
stock market prices.  Related to Schiller’s critique are arguments about the centrality of 
asymmetric information in financial markets, and specifically the influence exerted by ill-
informed “noise traders.”  For example, Shleifer’s (2000) presentation of the “behavioral 
finance” perspective  models financial markets as containing two kinds of traders, 
fundamental traders and noise traders.  But noise traders are not competed out of the 
market by the fundamental traders in this perspective.  This is because arbitrage is risky, 
costly, and therefore limited.  For example, when stock prices are inflated relative to 
fundamentals, arbitraurs who choose to sell short face potential losses from prices 
moving still higher under the influence of noise traders—that is, their short-selling will 
not necessarily drive prices down to fundamentals.  Thus, the actions of noise traders are 
not merely ephemeral to market activity, but rather exert a sustained influence on price 
formation.       
 
But a deeper point about Keynesian uncertainly also emerges from this 
perspective, as has been developed by Crotty (e.g. 1994) and other Post Keynesians.  If 
noise traders persistently and unpredictably move markets away from fundamentals, it no 
longer becomes logical for even well-informed traders and professionals to try to trade on 
 
9 The literature here is  voluminous.  Two collections of papers that build from Minsky’s contributions 
include Fazzari and Papadimimitrou (1992) and Dymski and Pollin (1994). Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




                                                
the basis of fundamental information.  It rather follows that professional traders should 
proceed as Keynes argued, to trade by trying to outguess market sentiment, moving ahead 
of the herd by “anticipating what average opinion thinks average opinion to be,” (1936, p. 
156).
10   
 
  Systems of Financial Regulation   
 
Overall then, according to these critical perspectives, thick but unregulated 
financial markets operate with substantial degrees of inefficiently and irrationally.  The 
general logic of this Keynesian perspective was the analytic foundation on which the post 
Depression and World War systems of financial regulations were constructed.  These 
regulations included the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and related 
capital control measures, implemented at the level of domestic economies, to control 
international capital flows and speculative currency markets.
11  The Glass-Steagall 
system of domestic financial regulations was established in the United States.  The main 
purpose of these regulations was to create barriers between various segments of the 
overall financial market, to limit the portfolio options for each market segment, and of 
course, most pertinent to our current focus, to regulate market interest rates.
12   
 
 Even more extensive systems of domestic financial regulations operated in most 
European economies and Japan.  Government regulations played a major role in 
determining both the cost of credit and the quantity of credit available for borrowers.  In 
these “bank-based” systems, government regulators operated in close association with 
banks and nonfinancial businesses determining the cost of credit.  The capital markets 
played a much more limited role in these economies in terms of mobilizing funds, 
allocating credit and influencing investment decisions.
13   
 
Focusing just on the role of central banks themselves, Epstein (2007) has recently 
shown that throughout the history of what are now the most developed economies in the 
world, central banks utilized a wide range of policy tools to influence financial market 
activities, including the setting of market interest rates. 
 
Virtually all central banks, including the Bank of England (BOE) and U.S. 
Federal Reserve (the Fed) have used direct means to support economic 
sectors.  And this has not simply been a matter of historical aberration, but 
rather, it has been an essential aspect of their structures and behavior for 
decades on end.  In particular, a crucial role for both the BOE and the Fed 
has been to promote the financial sectors of their economies, and 
especially, to support the international role of their financial services 
industries.  They have done this by using subsidized interest rates, legal 
 
10 See Crotty (1994) for a contemporary perspective on this question. 
11 Panic (1995) provides a useful brief overview of the initial design of the Bretton Woods system.  
12 Essays in Dymski, Epstein and Pollin (1993) describe the structure and evolution of the Glass Steagall 
system. 
13 These financial structures are described in Zysman (1983), Pollin (1995), and Grabel (1997). Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




                                                
restrictions, directed credit and moral suasion to promote particular 
markets and institutions (2007, p. 97). 
 
  From this historical perspective, then, it is clear that Central Banks have been 
highly concerned with exogenously influencing interest rates and overall access to credit.  
They have not relied on any single policy instrument, such as the Federal Funds Rate, to 
achieve adequate levels of effectiveness in these interventions. 
 
  The Demise of Financial Regulations   
 
These regulatory systems were strongly criticized virtually from the outset by free 
market proponents.  But the emergence of a persistent inflationary environment was more 
important to the demise of financial regulations than any purely academic critique.  
Among other difficulties created by inflation were sustaining appropriate exchange rates, 
managing interest rate ceilings, and limiting asset acquisition options for separate 
segments of financial markets.    But within a neoliberal analytic framework, these 
problems generated by inflation were seen as evidence in behalf of opening markets and 
minimizing regulations, not the basis for reforming the regulatory environment.  This was 
the basis on which, from the 1970s onward, financial markets globally have been 
increasingly deregulated.
14   
 
Central bank practices also changed dramatically in accord with the movement 
toward financial market deregulation.  Epstein’s 2007 paper summarizes this trend in 
central bank practice as follows: 
 
In the last two decades, there has been a global sea change in the theory 
and practice of central banking.  The “best practice” now commonly 
prescribed by the international financial institutions such as the IMF, as 
well as by many prominent economist, is best characterized as the “neo-
liberal” approach to central banking.  The main components of this recipe 
are: 1) central bank independence; 2) a focus on inflation fighting 
(including adopting formal “inflation targeting”) and 3) the use of indirect 
methods of monetary policy (i.e. short-term interest rates as opposed t 
odirect methods such as credit ceilings)….These principles have far-
reaching implications…The pursuit of indirect tools of monetary policy 
means that the central bank should not use credit allocation techniques 
such as subsidized interest rates, credit ceilings and capital controls to 
affect either the quantity or the allocation of credit (Epstein 2007, pp. 95, 
references removed from quote). 
 
  Dramatic Shifts in International Financial Flows   
 
 
14 See  Schaberg (2000) for institutional and econometric discussions of the decline of financial regulatory 
systems. Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




  Since the demise of Bretton Woods, the emergence of deregulated financial 
markets, and the refocusing of central bank policy, there has been an enormous increase 
in gross flows, i.e. the total amount of international lending as well as secondary market 
trading in stock, bond, foreign exchange, and derivative markets.  I present some 
representative data on these trends in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3 BELONGS HERE 
 
   
Panel 3A shows more detailed breakdown of foreign transaction between 1975 - 
2002 in bonds and equities as a percentage of GDP for six OECD countries, including 
here both secondary trading as well as primary issues.  In all six cases, the jump in cross 
border flows from 1980 has been spectacular--e.g. for the United States, the ratio of cross 
border transactions/GDP rose from 5.9 percent between 1975 – 79 to 256.7 percent in 
2000 – 2002.  The largest jump was that of Italy, where the ratio rises from 0.9 percent in 
1975 – 79 to 801.6 percent in 2000 – 01.   
 
In panel 3B we see broadly similar patterns with growth of foreign currency 
trading.    Since the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1973, the rise in currency trading and 
the gross flows of financial assets across borders is unprecedented.  As we see, the ratio 
of daily foreign exchange turnover relative to the reserves of all central banks rose 
spectacularly, from 6.9 percent of central bank reserves to 90.7 percent of reserves in 
1998.  In the aftermath of the 1997 – 98 Asian financial crisis, central banks have become 
much more committed to holding foreign exchange, and committing their own resources 
to achieve this.  Thus, average foreign reserve holdings for all countries rose by 84 
percent between 1998 – 2003.  For developing countries, foreign exchange holdings 
virtually doubled between 1998 - 2003.  This shift in central banks’ foreign exchange 
policy is then reflected in the fall in the ratio of daily foreign exchange market turnover to 
central bank reserves, to 58.7 percent in 2001 and to 62.2 percent in 2004.  In these most 
recent figures, we see one clear indicator of the rising costs that central banks must pay to 
protect themselves against the risks of financial crises engendered by speculation on 
foreign exchange markets.    
 
Effects of Financial Deregulation 
 
How have these financial patterns affected the setting of market interest rates and 
financial market activity more generally?  We consider this in terms of both short- and 
long-run effects.   
 
Short-term effects   
 
The rise of short-term financial flows has made economies much more susceptible 
to financial crises.  Among other factors, the very expansion of financial trading makes it 
more difficult for governments to control the inevitable periods of financial herd 
behavior.  Once a financial crisis has broken out and government must try to neutralize a Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




                                                
stampeding financial herd, their capacity to intervene effectively will be smaller when the 
size of the stampede is relatively large.  The logic of this is clear in the case of 
contemporary foreign exchange markets.  Precisely because daily trading on these 
markets rose from 6.8 percent of central banks’ foreign currency reserves in 1977 to 
roughly 85 percent by the mid 1990s, central banks had far less capacity to serve as a 
market-maker to counteract speculative stampedes.
15  Subsequent to the Asian crisis, the 
central banks then had to nearly double their holdings of foreign exchange to protect 
themselves against stampedes—and this doubling of foreign exchange holdings 
established the central banks at still only at roughly the ratio of market turnover/reserves 
as prevailed in the mid-1980s.  The 62.2 percent ratio is still 55 percentage points higher 
than the 6.9 percent ratio for 1977. 
 
The idea of financial markets becoming increasingly vulnerable to crises is fully 
consistent with the data since the early 1980s.  According to a study published by the 
IMF itself, nearly three-fours of the 182 members of the IMF, including a substantial 
number of developed countries, suffered one or more bouts of banking crises or 
“significant banking problems” during 1980-95 (Lindgren, Garcia and Saal 1996).  
Banking crises, defined in this IMF survey as “cases where there were runs or other 
substantial portfolio shifts, collapses of financial firms, or massive government 
intervention” afflicted 36 countries.  “Significant banking problems” defined as 
“extensive unsoundness short of crisis,” afflicted another 108.  The 1997 – 98 Asian 





 Paralleling the explosive post 1970s growth of international capital flows has 
been the sharp rise of long-term real interest rates. The figures in Table 4 on U.S. long-
term real rates give an indication of the world-wide pattern.  As we see in the table, the 
10-year Treasury Bond rate spiked at an average of 5.9 percent between 1980-84, after 
having ranged between 0.8 – 2.7 percent over the five year periods between 1955-79.  
The rate does fall in subsequent five-year periods after 1980-84, though by 1995-99, only 
to a still historically high 4.3 percent.  In 2000 – 04, the most recent full five-year period, 
the rate then falls to 2.7 percent, which is at the level of 1960 – 64.  But as we have seen, 
this was due to the Federal Reserve also pushing the Federal Funds Rate to its lowest 
levels in 50 years, in order to counteract the stock market crash and recession of those 
years.   
 
Moreover, as we see with the next column of the table, the decline in the BAA 
Corporate Bond rate is far more modest over 2000 – 04 than occured with the Treasury 
Bond rate.  Indeed, the differential between the BAA rate and the T-Bond rate in this 
2000 – 04 period, at 2.7 percent, is wider than any previous five-year period since 1955.  
As we have discussed above, this indicates that the risk premium in holding bonds of 
 
15 Felix (1998, 2001) considers this issue in some detail. Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




                                                
private corporations versus the U.S. government had reached its highest levels in these 
most recent years, even while the Federal Reserve was aggressively attempting to push 
real interest rates down. 
 
   TABLE  4  BELONGS  HERE 
 
The deregulation of financial markets has very likely played a major role in 
pushing real interest rates up and keeping them high, even to the extent of resisting 
Federal Reserve interventions to push them downward.  One study under the auspices of 
the OECD (Orr, Edey, and Hviding 1995) has calculated that about half the rise of real 
long-term interest rates in the 1980s was due to financial deregulation.  Felix (2001) 
proposes one causal link:     
 
Prior to decontrol, when the monetary authorities lowered short-
term interest rates to stimulate the economy, the major holders of long-
term bonds, notably insurance companies and private pension funds, 
anticipated, rightly or wrongly, inflationary consequences.  However, 
since fiduciary restrictions blocked them from holding stocks, they could 
merely move funds from longer to shorter-maturity bonds.  Capital 
decontrol gave them the opportunity to move funds instead between home 
and foreign bond markets in pursuit of higher yields.  That pushed up 
long-term rates, and to a lesser degree, short-term rates as well, and 
undermined the effort to stimulate the economy by monetary easing.  
(Felix p. 40). 
 
Other factors are also at play, including the trend rise in the demand for credit by 
households and businesses in the U.S,--i.e. rising credit demand—accompanied by the 
shift in monetary policy in favor of inflation-targeting, i.e. a tightening of credit supply.  
Note that these demand and supply considerations operated initially in a period of 
relatively large government deficits throughout the world, but persisted as the deficits 
were eliminated—suggesting that the government-deficit “crowding out” explanation for 
high real interest rates, at the least, must be placed in a broader analytic context.
 16    
 
 
Financial market regulation to Reduce Market Risk 
 
  Three basic principles should guide the formulation of a new financial market 
regulatory regime.  First, the regulatory environment should be consistent in the way that 
it affects all intermediaries and markets; in other words, following D’Arista and 
Schlesinger (1993), that policy engender an upward leveling of the regulatory 
environment.  Such an approach minimizes opportunities for rent seeking through 
exploiting regulatory differences among market segments.  A consistent regulatory 
structure is also easier to design, implement and enforce.   The second principle is that, as 
 
16 Pollin (1997) provides a framework for exploring these demand and supply shifts. Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




much as possible, regulations should work through altering market prices and incentives 
rather than establishing hard limits on market activity.   The third principle is the 
promotion of financial market activities in which social rates of return exceed private 
rates.  The U.S. Glass-Steagall system, for example, heavily supported the social goal of 
financing of individual-family housing, through limiting the assets of savings and loan 
institutions to mortgage loans. 
 
  This is not to say that determining social rates of return is always straightforward.  
But one clear choice would be to weight heavily the benefits accruing through financial 
stability itself.  Thus, any new regulatory environment should seek to limit the immediate 
sources of instability—herd behavior, the contagion effects of market trends, and the 
spillover effects from financial market activity to the broader economy.   
 
Two specific policy measures that are consistent with all three of these broad 
principles are asset-based reserve requirements and security transaction excise taxes.  
Asset-based reserve requirements would include Basel-type capital adequacy 
requirements, margin requirements on stock trading, and requirements limiting the 
composition of loans, such as had applied to savings and loans under the Glass Steagall 
system.  When they operate properly, such measures enable regulators to establish 
differential carrying costs to financial institutions according to the quality of the assets in 
their portfolio.  Thus, if financial market stability is the social outcome sought by such 
measures, then loans from regulated intermediaries that finance speculative trading would 
carry higher reserve or margin requirements.  The same technique is capable of 
promoting other goals as well, as was the case under Glass-Steagall with individual-
family housing. 
 
Securities transaction excise taxes, such as the so-called “Tobin tax” on foreign 
exchange markets, are an efficient way of raising the costs of short-term speculative 
trading in financial markets, as opposed to trading for the purpose of long-term asset 
holding.  Following the principle that regulations should be consistent across market 
segments, the tax should be imposed not simply on foreign exchange markets, as with 
Tobin’s initial proposal, but consistently across all markets.   
 
The idea of the tax is that it allows the market to screen out speculative from more 
stable financial flows.  This is because a small tax on a security transaction--for example 
a 0.5 percent tax on a equity trades--would create a negligible burden on asset owners 
who intend to hold their asset for the long-term.  However, if asset owners purchase a 
new stock with the intention of selling it at a profit in the short-term, the 0.5 percent tax 
would be imposed on each trade, and would thus constitute a significant burden.   
 
Proposals for these taxes have faced substantial criticism in recent years, in 
particular around the point that imposing them necessarily creates serious market Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




                                                
distortions and thereby new opportunities for rent-seeking.  But in fact, such measures 
can be implemented in a workable fashion across financial market segments.
17
 
Loan Guarantees and Interest-Rate Subsidies     
 
A final, and most direct, approach to injecting exogeneity into market interest 
rates would be to have explicitly rates administered by government policy.  This is, of 
course, by no means a far-fetched idea.  Indeed, as I emphasized earlier and has been 
recently discussed in the Epstein paper cited above, interest rate ceilings and other forms 
of direct credit subsidies had been standard practice both in the U.S. and elsewhere before 
financial markets were deregulated and central banks shifted their operating procedures 
in favor of indirect policy interventions.  Moreover, as noted above, bank-based financial 
systems operated with administered interest rates, establishing subsidized rates to channel 
credit to activities that were consistent with a government’s industrial policy goals. 
 
  One way to introduce subsidized interest rates that flexibly incorporates lender-
based assessments of risk and evaluations of collateral would be for government policy to 
offer explicit loan guarantees, with the costs of credit to borrowers declining in 
proportion to the degree to which the loan guarantees removed risk from private sector 
lenders.
18   
 
Under such an arrangement, the guarantees could be targeted at market segments 
that reflect social priorities.  For example, as I write now amid the mortgage market 
meltdown in the first half of 2008, one obvious priority would be to restore a stable 
market for affordable home mortgages, in particular for first-time home buyers.  A loan 
guarantee system for this market segment could be constructed roughly in terms of the 
following considerations.     
 
At its peak in 2006, total mortgage lending was at roughly $1.1 trillon.  Of this 
amount, roughly 15 percent, or $170 billion, was for home purchases for first-time home 
buyers.  Under the credit subsidy program, the U.S. government would therefore 
underwrite the fully $170 billion in mortgages for first-time homebuyers.  For purposes 
of illustration, let’s allow that the government underwrites a total of $200 billion in loans.  
We also assume that the level of guarantee is 50 percent of the principal on these loans.   
Deep into the market crisis at the end of 2007, the default rate on mortgage loans was 
 
17 Pollin, Baker and Schaberg (2003) surveys the literature on securities transaction taxes and offers a 
design proposal that would allow the tax to operate neutrally across segments of the financial services 
industry.  Feige (2005) offers interesting ideas on broadening transaction taxes to include all asset markets 
and relying on asset transaction taxes as a substitute for income taxes. 
18 My co-authors and I have recently considered similar policy interventions in the context of the South 
African and Kenyan economies in Pollin et al. (2007, 2008) and Pollin (2008). Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 




                                                
0.83 percent.  For the purposes of our exercise, let’s assume a default rate more than five 
times as large, of 5 percent.
19   
 
We therefore operate with three assumptions: 
 
1.  The government loan guarantee program assumes $200 billion in contingent 
liabilities to underwrite the first-time homebuyer mortgage market.    
2.  The default rate on these loans is 5 percent. 
3.  The guarantee on these loans covers 50 percent of principal. 
 
Under these three assumptions, it follows that the accruals to the government 
would amount to $5 billion/year (i.e. $200 billion x 0.05 x .50).  This figure would of 
course represent a significant commitment by the government.  Still, with the federal 
budget now at $2.8 trillion, this loan guarantee program would amount to less than 0.2 
percent of total federal spending.   This, again, is while making implausibly large 
assumptions about the scope of the program and about the default rate on mortgages. 
 
The next step in developing such a program would be to establish an appropriate 
subsidized interest rate on these loans.  The starting point is the long-term government 
bond rate, since these operate with no default risk, though, like long-term mortgages, they 
do incorporate inflation risk.  The default risk on a subsidized mortgage would then 
depend on 1) the credit profile of the individual borrower; and 2) the extent of the loan 
guarantee.  Based on this, the rate on concessionary loans should be set as an increment 
above the government bond rate.  How large an increment above the government bond 
rate should then depend on the borrower’s profile and on the extent of the government 
guarantee on loans. 
 
  To make this clearer, we can stipulate that a government bond faces zero default 
risk.  Thus, the interest rate on a private loan with a 100 percent guarantee should be set 
at exactly the government bond rate.  By contrast, the appropriate rate on a loan with no 
guarantee is, by definition, the market interest rate on the loan.  As such, the government 
bond rate and the market interest rate define the range within with concessionary rates 
should be set. 
 











19 Data in this paragraph are from the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Accounts and T2 Partners 
LLC, “Why We Are Still in the Early Innings of the Bursting of the Housing and Credit Bubbles,” March 
16, 2008, www.valueinvestingcongress.com. 
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lg is the rate on loan guarantees, i
m  is the market interest rate for a loan of a given 
risk class and maturity, C is the percentage of a loan that the government is guaranteeing, 
and i
b is the government bond rate for a given maturity. 
 
  To illustrate this calculation with an example, consider a case, based on actual 
market conditions in January 2008.  At that time, the 30-year mortgage market rate was 
5.76 percent and the 10-year Treasury Bond rate was 3.74, a spread of 2.02 percentage 
points.  Under the arrangement above, the subsidized rate on mortgages would fall by 1 
percentage point, to 4.76.  If one would want the subsidized rate to fall more, then we 
would increase the extent of the loan subsidy.   With a 75 percent guarantee, the 
subsidized mortgage rate would be 4.25 percent. 
 
  Under such a system of loan guarantees and subsidized interest rates, private 
lenders would still be bearing significant risks and would therefore have strong incentives 
to carefully evaluate loan applications. Moreover, such a system still operates with strong 
market incentives:  private lenders would still be bearing significant risks and would 
therefore have strong incentives to carefully evaluate loan applications.   
  
  Obviously, this is a very limited exploration on ways to establish a large-scale 
system of loan guarantees.  To make such a proposal workable would entail considerable 
development in terms of monitoring and creating disincentives for fraud.  It would also 
entail much more detailed work in appropriately defining the market segment that would 
be eligible for subsidies and the appropriate level of subsidy. 
 
  The simple point I am trying to underscore with this exercise is about the types of 
interventions that are needed to exogenously control interest rates.  Far greater degrees of 
interest rate exogeneity can be attained relative to current conditions.  But this cannot be 
accomplished if we insist that, to achieve interest rate exogeneity, it is sufficient to rely 
only on the Federal Reserve’s ability to set the Federal Funds Rate.   
 
 
4.  Conclusion  
 
  The contributions of Post Keynesian economists on the theory of money supply 
endogeneity—including the important initial work of Kaldor, Minsky, Davidson, Moore, 
and Rousseaus—have been considerable.  To begin with, as monetarism and allied 
approaches rose to professional hegemony in the early 1970s, the Post Keynesian 
theorists presented the first sustained challenges to this view.   
 
  Orthodox economists have now largely abandoned the main tenets of the quantity 
theory, at least in terms of policy practice, if not theoretical foundations.  At present, 
inflation targeting remains the dominant policy framework, though now without a 
coherent theory comparable to the quantity theory to guide policy practice.     
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  Meanwhile, Post Keynesians have made significant strides in advancing positive 
theoretical ideas and policy approaches.  Such analytic efforts—to the extent they are 
conducted rigorously—inevitably uncover weak features of the approach.  If not 
corrected, these weaknesses in turn lead to a stagnant research agenda and inadequate 
policy prescriptions, just as was the case with the quantity theory. 
 
  The debate among Post Keynesians on the nature of money supply endogeneity is 
now roughly two decades long.  From this vantage point, it appears that many of the main 
topics for debate have not been resolved, and are not likely to become resolved as long as 
the debate proceeds as it has to date.  Part of the reason for this is that the questions that 
tend to be asked are too broad and therefore difficult to pin down. 
 
I have tried in this paper to concentrate attention on one specific question—the 
degree to which market interest rates are determined exogenously.  Horizontalists have 
held strongly to the idea that “the interest rate” is determined exogenously  by central 
banks.  Building from my reading of the structuralist approach, I have argued by contrast 
that market forces are a major force—and are in most cases the major determinant—of 
market interest rates, especially at the long end of the markets.  I have also held that there 
are clear reasons for this endogeneity—in particular, the ongoing systemic instability of 
financial markets in capitalist economies, which lead market participants to made wide 
swings in their risk assessments over time.   
 
The problem of unstable financial markets arises from the fact that the inherent 
instability of markets becomes more severe when markets are permitted to operate under 
weak regulatory regimes.  The movement toward financial market deregulation since the 
1970s has therefore meant a movement toward increased interest rate endogeneity.  It 
follows that effective regulatory policies to stabilize markets and control interest rates 
directly will increase the degree of interest rate exogeneity.   
 
The importance of this question couldn’t be more clear in light of the ongoing 
financial crisis.  Projecting forward a positive research agenda, I would hope that a 
growing large number of researchers will take up the challenge to better understand the 
possibilities for increasing the degree of interest rate exogeneity, in the U.S. economy and 
elsewhere. Pollin, “Considerations on Interest Rate Exogeneity” 
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Figure 1.  Monetary Policy and Market Interest Rates
(Federal Funds, Baa Bond, 30-year Mortgages, 10-year Treasury Bond,
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Figure 2  U.S. Interest Rate Spreads:
Various Short- and Long-Term Rates minus Federal Funds Rate
Source:  Economagic.com Economic Time Series Page
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A)  Spread between Baa Corporate Bonds and 10-year T-Bonds
 Table 1.  U.S. Interest Rate Spreads: 
Various Short- and Long-Term Rates minus Federal Funds Rate 
(monthly data 1973.11 – 2008.02) 
 




T-Bill – Fed Funds 
 
- 0.51 0.84
Prime – Fed Funds 
 
2.33 1.16
T-Bond – Fed Funds 
 
0.98 1.84
Mortgages – Fed Funds 
 
2.69 1.74




Source:  Economagic.com Table 2.  Granger-causality Tests  
between the Federal Funds Rate and Market Rates 
 
Full period is 1973.11 – 2008.02  
(5 full NBER Business Cycles; 413 observations) 
 
Data are F-Statistics 
 
  Five Full Cycles   First and Most Recent Cycles 
  1973.11 – 2008.02  1973.11 – 1981.06  2001.03 – 2008.02 






















































































P-value ranges:  
 a) < 1%; 
 b) 1.1 – 5%; 
 c) 5.1 – 10%;  
d) > 10% 
 
Source:  Economagic.com  
TABLE 3.   
THE GROWTH OF FINANCIAL MARKET TRANSACTIONS 
 
 
3A)  Cross-Border Transactions in Bonds and Equities as Percentage of GDP 
 
  1975 – 
79 











5.9  13.0  73.5  108.7 183.8 256.7 
Japan 
 
3.2  13.9  129.0  82.2 80.6 104.3 
Germany 
 
6.9  12.9  51.7  102.5 257.3 474.0 
France 
 
-----  9.2  34.0  125.5 289.6 419.4 
Italy 
 
0.9  1.4  9.4  114.6 518.7 801.6
a 
 
Canada  4.5 
 
10.4  44.1  123.7 269.5 265.8 
Source:  Aerdt Houblen, Jan Kakes, and Garry Schinaski, “Toward a Framework for Safeguarding 
Financial Stability,” IMF Working Paper 04/101, Table A3.   
aFigures for Italy are for 2000 – 2001 only. 
 
 
3B)  Daily Foreign Exchange Markets Turnover as Percent of Total Central Bank 
Reserves 
 
1977  1980  1983  1986  1989  1992  1995  1998  2001  2004 
6.9  21.3 35.0 58.8 82.3 88.4 85.6 90.7  58.7  62.2 
Sources:  Felix (1998) for 1977 – 86.  For other years:   Daily Foreign Exchange Markets Turnover data 
from BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in April 
2004 , Table 1, P9.  Total central bank reserves from IMF, IFS CD-ROM2004. 





















Bond Rate – 
Treasury 
Bond Rate  
1955-59 1.1% 2.0% +0.9% 
1960-64 2.7  3.7  +1.0 
1965-69 1.9  2.9  +1.0 
1970-74 1.0  2.9  +1.9 
1975-79 0.8  2.5  +1.7 
1980-84 5.9  8.3  +2.4 
1985-89 5.7  7.9  +2.2 
1990-94 4.4  6.3  +1.9 
1995-99 4.3  6.2  +1.9 
2000-04 2.7  5.4  +2.7 
 
Sources:    Economagic.com and Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 